Introduction
We examine seasonal patterns in one-month LIBOR (London InterBank Offer Rate) futures and options on those futures. Specifically, we are interested in whether the recently identified year-end effect in one-month LIBOR passes through to the derivative securities. The seasonal pattern in the cash market must pass through to the derivative securities for the derivatives to be able to properly hedge risk and for the derivatives to provide unbiased predictions of future interest rates and volatility. While we expect that a seasonal pattern in the underlying asset will pass through into the related derivative securities, empirical evidence suggests that such seasonal patterns are not always common among related securities.
A large body of research studies seasonal patterns across stocks, bonds, money markets, and derivatives. The empirical evidence finds that the patterns vary across related securities. 1 
Flannery and
Protopapadakis (1988) , for example, compare day-of-the-week patterns in Treasuries bills, notes, and bonds and three stock indices. The patterns in the stock indices differ from those in Treasuries securities, which, in turn, vary by maturity. They conclude that there appears to be no one explanation for seasonal patterns across securities. Similarly, Jordan and Jordan (1991) 
examine the Dow Jones Composite Bond
Index and a stock index created to mirror the composition of the bond index for seasonal patterns. They find different seasonal patterns in the indices. Johnston, Kracaw and McConnell (1991) find day-of-theweek effects in GMNA, T-note, and T-bond futures, but not in T-bill futures. The lack of such day-ofthe-week effects in T-bill futures suggests a divergence between the spot market and the futures market since Flannery and Protopapadakis previously identified a day-of-the-week effect in T-bills. This suggests that spot market seasonalities may not always pass through to derivative securities. Yadav and Pope (1992) find mostly similar day-of-the-week patterns in the FTSE 100 index and LIFFE (London International Financial Futures Exchange) FTSE 100 index futures contract. There are, 1 however, a few notable exceptions that show that cash and futures markets can diverge. Griffiths and Winters (1996) examine fed funds futures and provide another example where the cash and futures markets diverge. The fed funds cash market has an identified biweekly increase in the mean and variance of the fed funds rate on settlement Wednesdays. 2 Griffiths and Winters find that the fed funds settlement effect does not pass through to fed funds futures prices. The divergence ocurs because the payoff to fed funds futures contracts is based on the average monthly funds rate, rather than the rate on a single day. Jones and Singh (1997) discover some divergence in the implied volatilities from sets of winner and loser stocks at the turn of the year. They find different implied volatilities for call and put options on loser stocks at the turn-of-the-year and increased implied volatility on both calls and puts for winner stocks at the turn of the year. The different implied volatilities between calls and puts on the same stock suggests a pricing divergence between the cash and options market. Griffiths and Winters (2004) examine various one-month money market securities-including one-month LIBOR-based interbank loans-at the turn-of-the-year and find a common effect across money market securities. Specifically, one-month rates increase dramatically at the beginning of December, remain high during December, and decrease back to normal at the turn-of-the-year, with the decline in rates beginning a few days before the year-end. 3 The year-end increase in one-month LIBOR is important to cash market participants because of the popularity of LIBOR as an interest-rate index. The pricing of this year-end effect in the LIBOR derivatives is important if market participants are to use these derivatives to hedge the year-end increase in the cost of funds and infer unbiased predictions of future interest rates and volatilities.
The evidence of divergence between the cash market and the derivatives markets-especially that 1 2 For example, see Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) , Griffiths and Winters (1995) and Hamilton (1996) . 3 The timing of the pattern suggests that money market investors plan their investment maturities to have cash available to meet year-end needs, which Griffiths and Winters describe as a year-end preferred habitat for liquidity (see Modigliani and Sutch (1966) for the development of the preferred habitat theory and Ogden (1987) for its application to T-bill yields).
of the money markets-prompts us to test one-month LIBOR futures and options on one-month LIBOR futures for the presence of the recently identified year-end rate increase in one-month LIBOR.
The LIBOR has become a popular reference rate for many interest-bearing financial products, such as variable rate commercial lines of credit. In addition, with the daily benchmarking of LIBOR by the British Bankers' Association (BBA), the LIBOR-based interest-rate derivatives offered by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) have become a popular interest-rate management tool. 4 For example, financial institutions use options on financial futures contracts to create caps and floors to limit their exposure to changing interest rates. The CME offers LIBOR-based financial futures contracts and option contracts on the LIBOR-based futures contracts.
The popularity of LIBOR-based financial products makes it important to understand their price behavior in light of the new evidence that a year-end regularity exists in one-month LIBOR. Specifically, this paper examines the pricing of LIBOR-based derivative contracts in three ways: 1) Are the turn-ofthe-year spot LIBOR market effects also present in the LIBOR futures and LIBOR options markets? 2) Are implied interest rates from LIBOR-based futures contracts unbiased predictors of future interest rates? Does the predictive bias differ at the turn of the year? and 3) Are implied volatilities (IV) for options on LIBOR-based futures contracts unbiased predictors of future realized volatilities (RV)? Does the predictive bias differ at the turn of the year?
The paper begins by reviewing the implications of the turn-of-the-year effect for pricing call options for interest-rate caps. We show that failing to recognize the year-end increase in LIBOR would result in underpricing the option by as much as $300 per million for December interest rate caps. We then analyze the LIBOR-based futures contracts to determine if the futures price provides an unbiased predictor of future LIBOR rates and properly prices the year-end cash market effect. The year-end effect in LIBOR does pass through to the LIBOR futures contract. In addition, the LIBOR future is a biased 2 Seasonality in One-Month LIBOR Derivatives predictor of future interest rates and the source of the bias appears to be related to the turn-of-the-year
effect. Finally, we analyze the predictive power of IV for the RVof LIBOR futures. The utility of these options as risk management tools depends on whether they reflect the year-end rate behavior of the underlying markets. The cash market year-end rate increase does pass through to the price of the option contract through higher volatility. In addition, the option contract provides biased estimates of realized volatility but the volatility bias is not related to the turn-of-the-year. The differences in the timing of the biases found in the futures and options contracts provides additional evidence that seasonal patterns need not pass through to related securities.
An Example of Pricing Interest-Rate Caps in a Cash Market with a Year-End Rate Effect
To illustrate the potential importance of the end-of-year effects on options prices-and interest caps-we consider a simple example in which call options on interest rates are priced using historical data as inputs into the Black/Scholes formula. Specifically, we use one-month cash market LIBOR to demonstrate the difference between the prices of call options on interest-rate futures in December and call options on interest-rate futures in other months.
In the one-month LIBOR data used by Griffiths and Winters (2004) , the LIBOR data has an average rate of 6.02 percent, with a standard deviation of 22.26 percent during the months of January through November. In December the average rate increases to 6.38 percent, with a standard deviation of 44.85 percent. To illustrate the potential importance of the end-of-year effects on options prices-and interest caps-we estimate one-month call prices for a sequence of strike prices from 5.20 percent to 6.70 percent using three pairs of means and volatility from historical data. The three sets are as follows:
1. Parameters from January through November data {S = 6.02, σ = 22.26 percent}.
2. Parameters from December data {S = 6.38, σ = 44.85 percent}. 3 3. December mean rate with January -November volatility {S = 6.38, σ = 22.26 percent}.
The hybrid (third) parameter set represents the "flat" implied volatilities for interest rate caps and floors that are provided by brokers. The flat volatilities are similar to cumulative averages of spot volatilities and therefore exhibit less variability than spot rates. Accordingly, the hybrid set of parameters provides an example of the pricing error possible in December if flat volatilities are used instead of the higher spot volatility.
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The solid line in Figure 1 displays the difference between the call prices for the JanuaryNovember call prices (set #1) and the December call prices (set #2) for a notional value of $1,000,000. In other words, the solid line shows that a call option on interest rates with a strike price of 6 percent and a notional value of $1,000,000 would cost about $315 more with the December mean and standard deviation as inputs {S = 6.38, σ=44.85 percent} than with the January-November statistics as inputs {S = 6.02, σ=22.26 percent}.
To show the marginal difference that the higher mean rate makes, the dashed line in Figure 1 labeled "constant volatility"-shows the difference between the January-November call prices (set #1) and the December prices using the January-November volatility (set #3). The marginal effect of the higher mean rate in December adds about $208 to the price of an interest-rate call option with a strike price of 6 percent. For lower strike prices, the higher mean interest rate in December adds as much as $300 per million to December interest rate caps. Falsely assuming constant volatility can lead to underpricing the interest-rate Cap option in December by as much as $150 per million.
This brief example illustrates that the year-end rate increase must pass through into the derivatives to properly price the options on LIBOR-based futures. This is particularly important for the writers of calls on interest-rate caps who will be exposed to increases in interest rates and volatility.
that cash settlement of the CME LIBOR futures contract led to the contract's success. 
CME One-Month LIBOR Futures Contracts
This section discusses and analyzes CME one-month LIBOR futures contracts. First, we describe the CME contract and our data. Then we analyze the futures prices to determine if the December cash market interest rate increase appears in the futures data. We conclude our analysis of the futures contract with a discussion of the futures' predictive power for the year-end effect.
Institutional Details and Data Description
The CME one-month LIBOR futures contract is a contract for a euro-dollar time deposit with a principal amount of $3,000,000. Contracts are available for each month of the year, up to 12 months ahead. A rise of one basis point in one-month LIBOR translates into a loss of $25 for each long contract.
The final settlement price is 100 minus the BBA one-month LIBOR. Contracts are cash settled on the second London business day immediately preceding the third Wednesday of the contract month. The CME has agreed with the BBA to use the BBA LIBOR benchmark rate as a basis for settling the CME one-month LIBOR futures contract.
Our data set consists of contract settlement month and year, opening price, closing price, high price, low price, total volume, and total open interest for each one-month LIBOR futures contract for the period 4/5/90 through 10/07/02. Following the usual practice in dealing with futures and options data, we use data from the month immediately preceding a contract's settlement month. In other words, our observations from December 1991 pertain to the futures contract that settles in January 1992. Johnston, Kracaw, and McConnell (1991) note this avoids any pricing problems associated with settling the contract and that this typically covers the period of highest volume in futures contracts. Figure 2 shows the time series of LIBOR daily futures prices and the final settlement price associated with the expiry of the contract. The daily settlement prices appear to track the final settlement prices-the BBA one-month LIBOR rate on the expiration date-fairly closely. There has been substantial variation in interest rates and future prices during the sample. (Newey and West (1987) ) that each 6 The final settlement price for one-month LIBOR futures contracts is F t = 100 -R t , where R t is the one-month LIBOR rate on the final settlement day. That allows us to back out the implied LIBOR from the futures price. 7 This exercise was robust to an alternative specification in which the dependent variable was the difference between the one-month LIBOR rate and the federal funds target. Hamilton and Jorda (2002) discuss the behavior of the federal funds target rate. They show no evidence of a year-end effect in the target rate. Also, their coefficient is equal to the mean of the rest of the coefficient vector. The only coefficient that is statistically significantly different from zero at the five percent level is that on the November indicator.
The fact that the coefficient on November was significantly greater than the mean coefficient indicates that the turn-of-the-year effect in LIBOR is priced in the futures market. 9 The effect appears in November rather than in December because the November data is for the contract that settles in
December. These regression results show that rates increase when the series switches to the December contract and declines when the series switches to the January contract. In other words, the December contract (November trading dates) has higher implied rates than the surrounding contracts. This effect is consistent with the turn-of-the-year effect found by Griffith and Winters (2004) in the cash market.
Do LIBOR Futures Prices Predict the December Increase in Spot LIBOR?
The preceding analysis makes it clear that the December futures contract price contains a higher implied LIBOR to accommodate the year-end rate increase in the cash market. So, the futures market anticipates the December rate increase in the cash market. The next question is how well futures prices predict spot rates, particularly the December rate in the cash market?
To examine the predictive ability of the futures market, we first estimate the following regression model for the entire sample using OLS:
where Settle t is the final settlement price for a contract trading on day t and Close t is the daily closing price on day t for the contract during the month preceding settlement. If the futures market is a conditionally unbiased predictor of the cash market, then α = 0 and β = 1. A predictor is said to be conditionally unbiased if its conditional expectation is equal to the predicted variable. Of course, futures prices need not provide unbiased forecasts of the future asset price. Nevertheless, the special case of unbiased predictions is a useful benchmark with which to compare the actual behavior of the data. 7 9 We note the November increase shown in Figure 3 is about 40 basis points (bp), which is similar in magnitude to the 36 bp (6.38 percent -6.02 percent) difference between the December average LIBOR and the average LIBOR Because closing prices at dates t and t+1 will both be used to forecast the final settlement price at T, the t and t+1 error terms in regression (2) will be correlated because they are both influenced by shocks from t+2 to T. In fact, all adjacent elements in the error vector will be correlated with each other and the degree of correlation will be higher for contracts with longer times to expiry. Such a data set is described as "telescoping" because the degree of correlation between adjacent errors declines linearly and then jumps up at the point at which contracts are spliced. To correctly measure parameter uncertainty, this paper uses a covariance estimator that corrects for overlapping forecast errors (Jorion (1995) :
, X is the T by K matrix of regressors, X
is the tth row of X, t εˆ is the residual at time t, and I(s,t) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the forecast from period s overlaps with the forecast from period t in equation (2).
We present the results of the regression in the first row of Table 2 . The first row shows that α is estimated to be 0.536 with a standard error of 0.899 and β is estimated to be 0.995 with a standard error of 0.009. The univariate coefficients and standard errors make it appear that the data are consistent with the unbiasedness hypothesis. For example, the β estimate suggests that for a $1 change in the daily closing price (Close t ) we would expect a $0.995 change of the same sign in the settlement price (Settle t ). A Wald test, however, reveals that { } β α, are in fact significantly different from {0,1} when the very strong negative correlation between the parameter estimates is taken into account in a multivariate test. The column in Table 2 labeled "PV1" shows that the p-value from the Wald test is essentially zero.
The preceding test shows that the implied interest rate from the futures price is not a conditionally unbiased predictor of the future one-month LIBOR interest rate. It does not tell us, however, whether the year-end affects the predictions of the futures market. That is, does the futures market predict the future 8 for the other eleven months found in the cash market data from Griffiths and Winters (2004) . Seasonality in One-Month LIBOR Derivatives interest rate in the same way in November as it does in the other months of the year? To investigate this question we estimated 12 versions of the following regression-one for each month of the year-allowing the coefficients for each month to change, one at a time:
where I(month(t) = x) is an indicator variable that takes on the value one for days on which date t occurs during month x, zero otherwise.
For each of the 12 regressions (4), we calculated Wald statistics for three null hypotheses:
1) The predictions of the other 11 months are unbiased when we treat one month differently,
2) The particular month should be treated the same as the other 11 months: { } These Wald statistics and their p-values are displayed in Table 2 in columns labeled "Stat 1," "PV1," "Stat 2," "PV2," "Stat 3," and "PV3." Rows labeled "1" through "12" indicate the results using each of the 12 months of the year, January, February,...December.
The low p-values in the column labeled PV1 indicate that the Wald tests for the first hypothesis, that { } β α, = {0,1}, reject the null in each case, despite the fact that the coefficients are typically very close to their values under the null of unbiasedness. It is certainly possible that even a small amount of measurement error-perhaps due to bid-ask spreads or small effects from illiquidity-in the regressors could generate sufficient bias in the coefficients to explain the very small but statistically significant bias.
The tests of whether the monthly coefficients are zero-{ } x x β α , = {0,0}-reject that hypothesis at the ten percent level for three months: January, February and November (see the column labeled PV2).
The November-specific coefficients-{ } Together, these findings suggest that the end-of-the-year effect bears some responsibility for the finding of bias in the futures prices.
3.4.
Do Futures Prices Subsume a Naïve Benchmark, the Current LIBOR Rate?
One might wonder about the information content of futures prices versus a naïve benchmark such as the current LIBOR rate. That is, does the futures price subsume the information in the current rate? To investigate this issue, we added a transformation of the current LIBOR rate to equation (4).
where LIBOR t is, of course, the LIBOR rate at time t. If interest rates are a martingale, the conditional expectation of final settlement should be the current LIBOR rate. Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (5) with robust standard errors for each of the 12 seasonals. The t statistics implied by the figures in the column denoted γ are never able to reject the null that the coefficient on current LIBOR equals zero. The futures price subsumes the naïve forecast.
Discussion of Results on One-Month LIBOR Futures Pricing
Our results suggest that the December one-month LIBOR futures contract prices include an expectation of higher cash market LIBOR in December and the magnitude of the effect in futures prices is similar to the magnitude in the cash market. This is particularly important because the higher December futures-implied rate allows these contracts to properly hedge the increased interest rates in December and to pass the December cash market effect through to the LIBOR options contract. The ability of futures prices to subsume the naïve forecast (current LIBOR) is undiminished by the seasonal factors. The next section of the paper examines whether options are priced correctly for the December cash market effect.
Our results also suggest that the futures market is, overall, a very slightly biased predictor of the future cash market spot rate. However, we feel that not much should be made of this because (1) the bias is economically small; (2) It appears to be focused around the turn of the year; And (3) it might be due simply to econometric problems. LIBOR futures prices subsume a naïve benchmark and provide reasonable forecasts of future interest rates with the caveat that care should be exercised in using these forecasts around the end-of-theyear. While specific information about bank system reserves and projected system needs likely dominate any information about general market trends for Desk open market operations, reasonable forecasts of future interest rates would still be a valuable tool for the Desk in managing interest rates.
Options on One-Month LIBOR Futures Contracts
Through the intimate connection between volatility and options pricing models, any end-of-theyear effects in the volatility of the underlying asset should carry through to the options market. That is, the price of an option depends on the volatility of the underlying asset (among other factors), so an endof-the-year effect in the price of the underlying asset that changes the volatility of the underlying asset should change the price of the option. In this case, the November price spike in the December LIBOR futures contract (which follows from the December rate spike in LIBOR) might change the realized volatility (RV) for the December contract and thus should also change the implied volatility (IV) of the December contract. This paper extends previous research by examining whether the prices of options on LIBOR futures contracts contain unbiased forecasts of the volatility of LIBOR futures prices and whether they reflect any end-of-the-year volatility effects that are seen in the market for the underlying asset.
To study the ability of markets to forecast conditional variance in LIBOR futures contracts, we obtained data on call and put options on one-month LIBOR futures contracts for the period 6/12/91 through 6/26/01. The price of an option is quoted in International Money Market (IMM) one-month LIBOR basis points. The actual price of an option is 25 times the quoted price. Options can be exercised by the holder on any business day that the option is traded until the expiry of the futures contract, until 7:00 p.m., the second London bank business day immediately preceding the third Wednesday of the contract month. In-the-money options that have not been exercised previously are exercised automatically at the termination of trading, in the absence of contrary instructions.
Options pricing models depend on the volatility of the return to the asset underlying the options contract. Latane and Rendleman (1976) pioneered the technique of inverting an options pricing modelusing the option premium and known arguments of the model: asset price, strike, interest rates, and time to expiry-to obtain volatility of the underlying asset until expiry. If the option pricing model is correct, IV should be an unbiased and informationally efficient forecast of RV, or one could generate excess returns by buying and selling options on the basis of a better volatility forecasting procedure.
Ironically, the IV used here-as in most of the literature-assumes that volatility is constant. Hull and White (1987) provide the foundation for the practice of using a constant-volatility model to predict stochastic volatility (SV): If volatility evolves independently of the underlying asset price and no priced risk is associated with the option, the correct price of a European option equals the expectation of the Black-Scholes (BS) formula, evaluating the variance argument at average variance until expiry:
where the average volatility until expiry is denoted as:
10 Bates (1996) extends the argument to approximate the relation between the BS IV and expected variance until expiry. For at-the-money (ATM) options, the BS formula for futures reduces to
. A second-order Taylor expansion of N(*) around zero yields:
Another second-order Taylor expansion of that approximation around expected variance until expiry shows that the BS IV approximates expected variance until expiry:
( ) ( ) 11 Note that (6) depends on (5), which assumes that there is no priced risk associated with holding the option. To the extent that this assumption is incorrect, IV will diverge from the market's true estimate of volatility.
where ln(F t+i /F t+i-1 ) 2 is the squared log difference of futures settlement prices between dates t+i-1 and t+i.
The Options Data
As discussed earlier, to construct a series of the most liquid contracts, the futures and options contract data are spliced in the usual way at the beginning of each month. That is, on each trading day of January, the settlement price for the February futures and the strikes and settlement prices for the two nearest-the-money puts and two nearest-the-money calls on the February options contracts are collected.
Unfortunately, there are many days, especially after the beginning of 1996, in which the options market was not sufficiently liquid to provide at least one put and one call with positive volume.
We choose to use IVs computed by the CME, rather than estimate them ourselves because the CME IVs were grossly similar to the latter and have fewer missing values. The CME supplies BaroneAdesi and Whaley (1987) IV on the futures contracts that we transformed to obtain the volatility on the futures price for the one-month LIBOR contract. We used IVs on the two nearest-the-money calls and two nearest-the-money puts. Cases for which fewer than two IVs were available were discarded.
Bates (1996) reports that using at-the-money options has become increasingly popular. There are three reasons to estimate IV from at-the-money options: 1) At-the-money options prices are most sensitive to changes in IV, meaning that changes in IV should be reflected in those options; 2) at-themoney options are usually the most heavily traded, resulting in fewer pricing errors due to illiquidity; and 3) research suggests that at-the-money IV provides the best estimates of future RV (e.g., Beckers (1981) ).
Therefore, choosing the two nearest calls and puts to estimate IV seems to be a reasonable procedure.
Options Summary Statistics
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The third and fourth columns of Table 1 display the summary statistics for the annualized statistics for IV and RV until expiration, on the days for which IV is available. Mean IV is 0.606 percent, and mean RV until expiry is a bit lower at 0.551 percent per annum. This is consistent with findings in other option markets and might be due to a price of volatility risk that "overprices" options compared to the price implied by the risk-neutral distribution.
Seasonality in One-Month LIBOR Derivatives
The volatility risk problem reflects the fact that there are two sources of uncertainty about the value of an option in a SV environment: the change in the price of the underlying asset and the change in its volatility. An option writer will have to take a position both in the underlying asset (delta hedging) and in another option (vega hedging) to hedge both sources of risk. If the investor only hedges with the underlying asset-not using another option too-then the return to the investor's portfolio is not certain.
It depends on changes in volatility. If such volatility fluctuations represent a systematic risk, then investors must be compensated for exposure to them. In this case, the Hull-White result (6) does not apply because there will be risk associated with holding the option and the IV from the BS formula will not be the approximate conditional expectation of objective variance as in (7).
The autocorrelation statistics should be viewed with some caution because of the many missing observations in the series. Nevertheless, first-order autocorrelations exceeding 0.9 for both series are consistent with the known persistence of IV and RV in other asset markets. . 12 IV appears to be fairly volatile but to weakly track the RV series. There is some tendency for both series to covary positively with the overall level of interest rates.
To study whether there is a seasonal component in the level of interest rate volatility, Figure 5 shows the annualized monthly means of RV and IV, with associated 2-standard error confidence intervals, in percentage terms. The January figures, for example, refer to the RV and IV of the futures contract expiring in February. It is difficult to discern from the figure but mean IV is higher than RV in most months. And there is a seasonal component associated with the December rise in interest rates shown in 15 12 We note that toward the end of our data period where the option contracts on LIBOR futures have very little volume there is substantial volume in the option contract on euro-dollar futures. While there are obvious differences between the LIBOR futures contract and euro-dollar futures contract, both option contracts provide essentially that same hedging ability, so we inquired of the CME for a reason why the options volume has gone to the euro-dollar options and away from the LIBOR options. The CME knew of no structural or contractual reason why the eurodollar option now receives the vast majority of the volume in interest rate options. The CME did suggest that, in Figure 3 . 13 Mean IV and RV in November (0.98 and 0.79 percent) are significantly higher than the unconditional means of IV and RV. It appears that the end-of-the-year effect makes RV higher than normal in November and the market more than fully anticipates this increase. That is, it appears that the options market understands that volatility rises at the year-end and might over-compensate for the increased volatility of the underlying futures price.
How Well Does IV Predict RV Until Expiry?
Whether IV from LIBOR options on futures prices is an unbiased predictor of volatility is investigated by estimating variants of the following predictive equation:
Re , where is the RV from t to the expiration of the option at T, and is the IV estimated from options prices from t to T. The annualized root mean squared log returns of daily futures prices measures volatility until expiry (equation (8)).
We are also interested, however, in the predictive ability of IV in each month of the year.
Specifically, does IV pick up an end-of-the-year volatility effect? Recall from section 2 that the volatility of one-month LIBOR increases dramatically in December and the cash market effect passes through to the LIBOR futures contract; so, for the option contract to properly hedge the increased volatility in the cash market, the IV of the December options must also increase. Because of that, we estimate the following variant of the predictive equation (9) with monthly indicator variables.
(10)
The estimation equations imply that IV at date t will forecast RV from t+1 to T. Similarly, IV at date t+1 will be used to forecast RV from t+2 to T. Therefore, the t and t+1 error terms in regressions (9) and (10) will be correlated with each other and the degree of correlation will be higher for contracts with interest-rate options, volume creates volume, so once the euro-dollar option created some volume it attracted more volume. longer times to expiry. That is, the options data set is "telescoping." The most common method for estimating (9) and (10) has been to use OLS with all forecast horizons, that is, "telescoping" samples.
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The OLS coefficient estimates are still consistent in the presence of autocorrelated error terms but the usual OLS standard errors are invalid, so robust standard errors are constructed as in (3). Table 4 shows this paper's estimates of (9) and (10) for LIBOR options-on-futures and RV in the LIBOR futures market from 1991 through July 2001, with robust standard errors (see equation (3)). As in previous research-e.g., Jorion (1995) ; Canina and Figlewski (1993) ; Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1993) ; Fleming (1998) ; Christensen and Prabhala (1998) and Neely (2004a Neely ( , 2004b )-when all the data are used with no seasonal effects, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant but far less than the hypothesized value of one under the null that the IV is unbiased (first row of Table 4 ).
βˆ
Hypotheses similar to those investigated for closing/settlement prices from Table 2 are also considered for IV/RV in Table 4 . For each of the 12 IV/RV regressions (equation (10)) with the monthly dummies, we calculated Wald statistics for three null hypotheses: 1) IV from the other 11 months is unbiased when we treat one month differently, { } β α, = {0,1}.
2) IV from one particular month should be treated the same as the other 11 months: { } Row and column headings in Table 4 are analogous to those in Table 2 .
First, it is clear that IV is a conditionally biased-overly volatile-predictor of RV. The column labeled PV1 shows that one can reject the hypothesis that { } β α, = {0,1}, even when other months are treated differently. When monthly indicators are used, the value of the coefficient doesn't change too much-it remains between 0.501 and 0.627 no matter which month is treated differently. Probably due to βˆ 13 Recall that the December rise in interest rates is associated with the fall in November futures prices.
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14 Christensen and Prabhala (1998) also estimate versions of (9) with feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) for one short subperiod but find it does not help IV's bias or efficiency. See Table 6 in that paper. the scarcity of data, the coefficients on the monthly indicators are imprecisely estimated and highly variable-they range from -0.504 to 0.540. Univariate t tests often fail to reject that many equal zero.
x βŜ econd, one can reject the hypothesis that IV from one particular month should be treated the same as the other 11 months, { } x x β α, = {0,0}, for four months: March, May, September (at the ten percent level), and October (see, Stat2 and PV2). The data reject that IV's predictive properties are the same for these months as they are for the rest of the year.
Third, of these four months, we also reject unbiasedness-{ } declines; IV appears to be even more volatile than in the rest of the year.
We conclude that IV is an apparently conditionally biased forecast of future volatility. In addition, RV is higher for the December option contract than for the contracts in any other month and the high level of IV in November shows that the market anticipates this increase. The low value of the November-specific coefficient on IV -{ } x β β+ = 0.464-shows that IV is an overly volatile predictor of RV in November, as it is for most of the rest of the year.
The timing of the biases differs for the futures and options markets' predictions. In the futures, January and November are different from the other months and provide biased estimates of future interest rates. In the options, May, September and October are different from the other months and IV in these months provides biased estimates of RV. That is, the bias in the futures contract surrounds the year-end while the bias in the options contract appears to be unrelated to the year-end. While these are clearly two very different types of forecasts, it is surprising that these related derivatives would have difficulties with forecasts at different times of the year. This result suggests a divergence between options market and the underlying markets.
Why Is IV a Biased Predictor of RV?
Recent research has found that IV is apparently a biased predictor of RV in a variety of markets.
If IV appears to be biased then either there is some significant deviation from the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) or inappropriate testing procedures-including the possibility that volatility risk is priced-provide misleading inference. We follow most studies in attributing IV's forecasting bias to one or more of the possible flaws with the testing procedures. We briefly discuss possible problems below.
Finite-sample, persistent-regressor bias will surely exist with the overlapping data used here.
Simulations in other markets suggest that this could be significant but would not explain the whole thing.
Neither is there likely to be much error in IV estimation from illiquidity/high transactions costs. A third source of bias could be sample selection. If IV is available only when RV takes certain values, the estimate of β will be biased (Engel and Rosenberg (2000)). For example, if IV is missing when RV exceeds a certain threshold, a regression of RV on IV will produce a downward biased coefficient estimate. Finally, it is possible that the simple option pricing models used here don't account for important aspects of option pricing such as the pricing of volatility risk or jump risk. Nevertheless, it is intriguing that IV's bias appears to have a seasonal component because such effects have not previously been considered as a source of bias.
Does IV Subsume Historical Volatility?
It is again of interest to compare IV's information content to a simple benchmark, the annualized root 20-day moving average of squared futures returns, usually called historical volatility. To investigate this issue, one can add historical volatility to (10):
If one rejects that the coefficient on historical volatility (γ) equals zero, then one also rejects the idea that IV subsumes this naïve benchmark forecast. Table 5 shows that the one cannot reject the hypothesis that γ equals zero for the entire sample and in 11 of 12 months. The one exception is September, for which the t statistic is 1.66 with a one-sided p-value of 0.0485. September was also a month in which IV was biased when September was treated differently than the other 11 months. Accordingly, we conclude that IV subsumes the benchmark historical volatility forecasts in almost every case. Given that we are conducting 13 highly correlated tests, it is difficult to know how to interpret one rejection.
Conclusion
We have three goals for this paper. First, we want to determine if the December rate increase in LIBOR passed through into the prices of LIBOR derivatives contracts. Second, we want to determine if the derivatives prices can provide unbiased predictions of their spot analogues. Third, we wish to evaluate whether there are seasonals in the predictive properties of futures prices and IV.
With respect to the first goal, the December rate increase in LIBOR pass through into the December LIBOR futures contract price. In addition, the increased December volatility in LIBOR is reflected in higher IV from options-on-LIBOR futures. This is important because the appearance of the December effect in the derivatives contracts means that these contracts can potentially be used to hedge the interest rate risk from the December increase in LIBOR.
On the second goal, the futures contract is a slightly biased predictor of future interest rates and the evidence suggests that seasonal factors could contribute to this bias. In particular, January and November forecasts differ from those in other months and the futures price is a biased predictor in these months. Interestly, the bias in these months goes in opposite directions: the November futures prices are insufficiently volatile forecasts of the final settlement price while January futures prices are overly volatile. The overall bias is economically very small, however, and could well be due to a small risk premium or minor measurement error. Consistent with the idea that the bias is not economically important, futures prices subsume a naïve forecast of future LIBOR rates, the current LIBOR rate.
One reason for looking at the predictive ability of the LIBOR futures contract was to determine if the futures contract could be used to improve the forecasting ability of the FOMC trading Desk for managing interest rates. While we recognize that the FOMC trading Desk focuses on other information in determining their daily market interventions, our results suggest that using the LIBOR futures contract can provide useful forecasts of future interest rates with the caveat that extra care must be used to fully understand the behavior of interest rates around the turn-of-the-year.
Third, we examine the IV and RV of the options of LIBOR futures. November IV (for the December contract) clearly anticipates the strong rise in end-of-the-year interest rate volatility. IV is also a significantly biased predictor of the RV of the futures contract. The data suggest that IV predictive abilities for RV are different in May, September and October than in other months and the predictions in these months are biased. To our knowledge, this is the first finding of seasonality in IV predictions.
Surprisingly, these biases in IV are not related to the end-of-the-year effect. IV almost always does, however, subsume historial volatility forecasts.
The goal of this project is to determine if the one-month LIBOR derivative contracts behave as expected given the previous evidence on the divergence in seasonal patterns among related securities.
Specifically, it is important that the year-end rate increase in one-month LIBOR pass through to the related derivative securities for these derivative securities to work properly in hedging and forecasting.
We find that the December increase in LIBOR and LIBOR volatility pass through to the derivative contracts, which allows for hedging the underlying interest rate increase. In addition, both the futures contract and the option contract provide biased forecasts, but in both the futures and option the forecasts from the derivative contract subsume a naïve benchmark suggesting the forecasts have economic value.
While we find a seasonal pattern in the bias in both derivatives, the seasonal pattern differs between the futures and the options. This suggest that the pricing of the options diverges from that of the futures contract and thus provides more evidence of the divergence in the pricing of related securities. 100*ln(F(t)/F(t-1)) 249*100*|ln(F(t)/F(t-1))| σ IV,t,T σ RV,t,T 
shows the results constraining the coefficients to be the same for all 12 months of the year. Rows (2-13), labeled 1-12 under the "month" column, shows the results permitting the January through December coefficients to differ from the coefficients in the other months of the year. The first four columns present the estimated coefficients from the regressions, with Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. The futures price subsumes the current LIBOR rate for the cases in which we fail to reject that γ equals 0. 5.50% 6.00% 6.50% 7.00%
Strike Rates
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Notes: The solid line displays the difference between the call prices for the January-November call prices {S = 6.02, σ=22.26 percent} and the December call prices {S = 6.38, σ=44.85 percent} for an interest rate call option with notional value of $1,000,000. The dashed line-labeled "constant volatility"-shows the difference between the January-November call prices {S = 6.02, σ=22.26 percent} and the December prices using the January-November volatility {S = 6.38, σ=22.26 percent}. Wald-tests (Newey and West (1987) ) that each coefficient is equal to the mean of the coefficient vector.
A p-value less than 0.05 rejects the null that the corresponding coefficient in the top panel is equal to the mean of the 12 coefficients. 
